

THE TRANSFORMATION OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING DURING THE REFORM PERIOD: A BOURDIEUN ANALYSIS

This paper details how an emerging country, Indonesia, struggled to apply a new government accounting system in order to increase transparency and accountability during the socio-political institutional change that characterised the post-Suharto *reformasi* (reform) period. The conceptual framework of field, capital and habitus articulated by Pierre Bourdieu (1990) is used to analyze the configuration of, and the roles of various players involved in, transforming the Indonesian government accounting system. The study uses primary material from governmental bodies and organizations, donor agencies, and independent newspapers and prior academic research to investigate whether political transformation from the authoritarian Suharto 'New Order' regime to a multi-party democratic process, occurred primarily through the 'capital' possessed by external donor agency pressure, or whether transformation was facilitated or impeded by the capital and habitus of other field participants, including government, the parliament, the state audit board and the profession/academia.

Keywords: Indonesia, emerging countries, government accounting, Bourdieu, field, capital, habitus.

INTRODUCTION

This study uses primary material from governmental bodies and organizations, donor agencies, independent newspapers and prior academic research to investigate whether political transformation from the authoritarian Suharto 'New Order' regime to a multi-party democratic process, facilitated socio-political and economic institutional reform within governmental accounting.

Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social capital (1990), with its emphasis on field, actor capital and habitus, is used to examine the dynamism of Indonesian government accounting. Field is defined as the social relationship network, which are structured systems of social positioning within which struggles or maneuvers take place over resources, stakes and access (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 17). Capital refers to resources endowed by participants within the field. Capital is materialized and within embodied forms (Bourdieu, 1986). Habitus refers to a concept that expresses, on the one hand, the way in which individuals "become themselves", develop attitudes and dispositions, and, on the other hand, the way in which those individuals engage in practices (Webb, et al., 2002, p. xii).

Accounting within Indonesian local government has also been studied by Djamhuri (2009) and Marwata (2008) using institutional theory. Both found the public sector failed to fully embrace accrual accounting. Studies on government accounting in transitional countries using Klaus Luder's contingency model, including Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (Godfrey, et al., 1996), Sudan (El-Batanoni and Jones, 1996), Madagascar (Oliorilanto, 2008), Malaysia (Saleh, 2005), Estonia (Haldma and Jõgi, 2006), Albania (Godfrey, et al., 2000), Romania (McKendrick, 2007), Chile and Argentina (Perez and Hernandez, 2005), and Indonesia (Harun and Robinson, 2010); found that a

country's socio-political structures ultimately determine the extent of government accounting modernization.

Whilst Luder's contingency model and institutional theory can explain changes in government accounting, both theories are not able to fully explain how social constructs influence a country's ability to implement and action accrual accounting as one mechanism for increased accountability and transparency. Harun and Robinson (2010), Djamhuri (2009) and Marwata (2008) did not seek to explain why institutions in Indonesia were hesitant in adopting a new government accounting system. In order to address this, the current study questions how and why institutions and agents involved in transitioning toward the new government accounting system, used their owned internal resources such economic and cultural capital as part of the transition process. The current study uses three time frames; prior to 1998, when Indonesia was under an authoritarian regime; 1998-2004, when Indonesia was transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy; and post 2004, when full democracy emerged, as indicated by direct presidential and parliamentary elections.

The paper specifically focuses on Indonesia as a transitional economy, one that is experiencing a move from a centrally planned to a market-based economic system. Like Indonesia, Vietnam and Estonia were both hit by high inflation (at 300 and 258 percent respectively) in the early 1990s before societal reform began through economic liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, restructuring, privatization and realignment of the legal and institutional framework (Ronnås and Sjöberg, 1991; Gillies, et.al, 2002; The IMF, 2000). Endemic corruption within state bureaucracy is another feature of a transition country (Hellman and Kaufmann, 2001). Whilst a transition country continually faces complicated socioeconomic problems, this is often coincided with attempts to improve its system of public finances. Vietnam, Estonia, Latvia and

Lithuania are examples where government accounting was reformed in the 1990s (Painter, 2003; Bailey, et.al, 1995).

This paper is organized into four sections. First, it outlines previous research on government accounting change. Secondly, Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social capital will be discussed as a research framework. The third section will examine the field of Indonesian government accounting. Finally, an overall assessment of Indonesia's experience in introducing a new government accounting system will be provided.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The adoption of accrual accounting within government can be viewed as a mechanism for public accountability and transparency enhancement. The International Public Sector Accounting Standard Board (IPASB) encourages governments to adopt the accrual basis of accounting (IFAC, 2003a). Accrual accounting in government is purported to allow users of government financial reports to better assess government accountability of all the resources it controls and their deployment, performance and decision-making (IFAC, 2003b). Accrual accounting allows greater transparency with respect to future pension liabilities (Khan and Mayes, 2009).

The implementation of accrual accounting however has not been without difficulty in developed countries. Studies on government accounting in Italy find that the implementation of accrual accounting gave unclear benefits in decision making and accountability. Accrual based reports also did not identify effective and efficiency indicators and did not create any new opinion or engender political debate (Steccolini, 2004; Caperchione and Mussary, 2008). Studies in Australia have found that accrual accounting was appropriate for public heritage assets (Barton, 2000) but the application

of accrual accounting assumptions biased public sector output costs (Carlin, 2005). Connolly and Hyndman (2006) found that the advantages of resource accounting (a new accounting system for the UK public sector), was unknown.

Any change in the system of government accounting also creates problems within organizations. Carpenter and Feroz's (2001) study on four state governments in the United States (US) found that the change of accounting system also affected power relationships within organizations. Another US study also found that accounting system change had impacts on conflict reorganization within government bodies (Chan, 1997). A similar situation occurred in the UK whereby local authorities and the central healthcare sector were under pressure to adopt new accounting techniques from central government (Jackson and Lapsley, 2004).

Examples exist highlighting the lack of organization resistance in internalizing accrual accounting within organizational bodies. Pinaa, et.al 's (2009) study on European continental countries found that accrual accounting had overcome resistance because the application of accrual accounting in these countries did not require the introduction of deep organizational changes. Traditional budgetary statements on the cash basis continued to be maintained for administrative decision making purposes. In addition, Piina, et.al (2009) found that accrual accounting was easily adopted with respect to liabilities and financial assets. By contrast, its implementation was slower in physical assets, in the operation statement and in disclosures related to retirement benefits, which all involved a departure from cash accounting practices, implying the difficulties in embedding accrual accounting in its entirety.

Studies on government accounting in developed countries also explain how adoption of accrual accounting occurs. Luder and Jones' (2003) study on Finland, France, Netherland, Switzerland, UK, Spain and Sweden found that local governments in those

countries preceded national government when applying accrual accounting. They conclude that the 'change players' were ministers, the accounting profession and parliament commissions. Montesinos (2008) found that in Spain, the change to accrual accounting was supported by political and administrative actors. In Australia, change occurred because of the role of private consultant firms and political actors, whilst in New Zealand it was more likely to improve managerial systems rather than accountability (Pallot, 1997).

Whilst accrual accounting has been adopted almost in its entirety in developed economies, it continues to be adopted as part of public financial management reform across developing countries in Asia, Africa, South America and Europe (IFAC, 2008). Whilst changes were induced by internal pressures in developed countries, changes were facilitated by external factors such as the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in developing countries (James and Manning, 1996, p. 145). In addition, these supranational organizations worked conjointly with international accountancy professional bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) to facilitate changes in the system of government accounting in developing countries (Hepworth, 2003, p. 37; IMF, 1999). Ghana, for example, is a country that changed its government budget and accounting system with international consultant assistance, however, the government was not able to produce simple budgetary reports despite spending millions of dollars (US) to establish the system (Wynne, 2008). Unfortunately, no clear indications are evident regarding the reasons behind the difficulty.

Most studies on government accounting research within developing countries are aimed at assessing sociopolitical structures that may facilitate or hinder the application of the accrual accounting method. For example, a study on Kenya, Uganda and

Tanzania (Godfrey, et al., 1996) found that only Tanzania had a favourable socio-political structure in which to apply accrual accounting, whilst Sudan (El-Batanoni and Jones, 1996) did not. A Malaysian study found organisations did not recognize changes in government accounting, despite the presence of stimuli including external pressure groups from the donor agencies, because societal, political and administrative actors in that country did not exert enough pressure for reform (Saleh, 2005). Meanwhile, the lack of political commitment and effective communication between civil servants and accountants caused the implementation of accrual accounting to fail in Madagascar (Oliorilanto, 2008).

An interesting phenomenon is that government accounting changes, in turn, facilitate sociopolitical reform for countries that transition from totalitarianism to democracy. Studies have investigated government accounting change in transitioning countries, for example Estonia (Haldma and Jõgi, 2006), Albania (Godfrey, et al., 2000), Romania (McKendrick, 2007), Chile and Argentina (Perez and Hernandez, 2005). In Estonia, Albania and Romania, it was found that government accounting reform was encouraged by international donor agencies and the European Union, and endorsed by political and social actors (Haldma and Jõgi, 2006, Godfrey, et al., 2000, McKendrick, 2007). Meanwhile, Argentina and Chile were able to improve their government financial information systems although both countries were under dictatorships at the time (Perez and Hernandez, 2005). After democratic transition in both countries, further change occurred, instigated by Argentine politicians enquiring about unknown sums of debt owing to the government, and by the Chilean parliament when it deliberated on a new budget law (Perez and Hernandez, 2005).

Indonesia, as a emerging and developing country¹, also changed its government accounting system as a part of its socio-political reform agenda. Harun and Robinson (2010) find that the Indonesian public sector failed to fully embrace accrual accounting. Barriers to implementation were inconsistencies between state finance laws and government accounting standards; resistance within the government bureaucracy by ignoring State Audit Board audit findings and recommendations, and by having low commitment to accountability among senior managers across all departments. Furthermore parliamentary members did not participate because of a lack of understanding about accounting processes. Another barrier was insufficient skilled government staff to implement and operate the new accounting system. However, Harun and Robinson's study (2010) do not elaborate as to why the resistance occurred and how government, parliament and the civil service sought to facilitate or impede change.

Marwata (2008) examined the adoption of the accrual-based accounting system by Indonesian local government. Marwata found that accounting reform within local government was stimulated by external forces such as 'push' factors from central government regulations, new systems promoted by consultants and academics, demands for more transparency by the general public and 'pull' factors such as loan inducements from funding agencies, technical assistance from donor agencies, and social and political recognition. Change was facilitated by favorable internal factors such as the desire of the organizational elite to be reputable, the existence of motivated human resources both in terms of willingness and ability to convert accounting systems, and the existence of committed leadership. However, the change was viewed as symbolic in order to enhance the appearance of the organization and it was treated as an isolated matter, unrelated to daily and organizational business.

¹ <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/groups.htm#ae>

Djamhuri (2009) examined governmental accounting and budgetary reform at a local government municipality in Indonesia. His findings are that reform has only succeeded in institutionalizing the system ceremonially and that new systems were loosely coupled from the existing municipality's socio cultural realities. Reform failed to be embedded in the day to day operations of the municipality because of insufficient quantity and expertise of local accounting staff, rigidity of its bureaucratic culture, and the influence of Javanese concepts such as "*pangreh praja*" and "*pamong praja*"² (Djamhuri, 2009). The financial statements produced by the local government were of little use given that the municipality depended entirely on its central government for financing. These three previous studies on Indonesia therefore imply that Indonesian government accounting reform has not led to increased managerial and institutional accountability.

As outlined previously, research on government accounting in developing and emerging countries remain limited in number. Most studies have placed emphasis on the country's sociopolitical and economic structure at a particular point in time. Accordingly one is left with a 'snapshot' as opposed to a 'definitive picture' regarding the change process. Change should be seen as an evolutionary process when examining the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Research that places transition within an historical context has the ability to provide a richer analysis regarding how sociopolitical institutions move toward accountability and transparency.

Many scholars (Chan, 1996; Pallot, 1996; El-Batanoni and Jones, 1996; Godfrey, et.al, 1996; Christensen, 2002; Montesinos, 2002; Caperchione and Mussari, 2002; Luder, 2002; Luder and Jones, 2003; Perez and Hernandez, 2005; Saleh, 2005; Jorge, 2005; Haldma and Jogi, 2006; McKendrick, 2007; Olioriantono, 2008; Harun and Robinson, 2010) have

² Pangreh praja refers to the core of generalist regional administrators in the colonial bureaucracy, as opposed to government employees in specialized or technical agencies. They formed the elite of the native administrative corps. After 1946, the name was changed to pamong (Anderson, 2006, p.28, n.29)

used Luder's contingency theory (Luder 1992, 2002) to explain on how governments transform their accounting systems. The central feature of the Luder model is defining sociopolitical and economic variables which promote or hinder government accounting reform within a country. However, the model places heavy emphasis on contextual factors with little attention paid to the process by which innovation takes place (Marwata and Alam, 2006). This limits our understanding on how government accounting reform has progressed from an historical perspective (Christensen, 2002).

Institutional "isomorphism" theory has also been used as a basis for explaining how and why country change their government accounting systems. Carpenter and Feroz (2001), Marwata (2008) and Djambhuri (2009), for example, use institutional theory to explain government accounting reform. Institutional theory specifies that organizational change occurs as a result of processes to make organizations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) but the adoption of new practices and procedures is aimed at increasing organization's legitimacy and survival prospects (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). In response to new technical activities, an organization maintains ceremonial conformity by reflecting institutional rules as a buffer to their formal structures from new practices and procedures. This creates gaps between the formal structure and actual work activities, and accordingly, new technical activities become loosely coupled with the organization structure (Meyer and Rowan, 1991).

Despite institutional "isomorphism" theory providing an explanation of how homogeneity influences an organizations legitimacy within its social environment, the theory neglects problematic issues, such as explaining an organizations' historical experience and how organisational legitimacy relates to our understanding of how change occurs, issues of politics, conflict and legitimacy and the identification of a field (Oakes, et.al, 1998). In contrast to institutional theory, Bourdieu (1985) emphasises

internal heterogeneity by perceiving the social world that is structured around the opposition between economic power and cultural capital, which produce fundamental differences in opinion. Institutional theory does not problematize internal differences when diffusing homogeneity concepts within organizations (Benson, 2006). Regarding change, the ability of institutions to comprehend new forms of government accounting depends upon economic and cultural capital that differs among institutions related to the system. As the diffusing process differs internally, the level at which countries comprehend accrual accounting also differs, despite the fact that the same accrual method is used.

The summation above indicates that government accounting studies on transitional economies requires further enrichment. Previous studies only capture the sociopolitical structures influencing government accounting change. They do not explore how institutions build their power historically in responding to change. In order to address this research gap, the current study uses a transition country, namely Indonesia to argue that capitals, especially economic and cultural, are the institutions' power to adapt or not adapt to, new accountability systems. We apply Pierre Bourdieu's sociology as the theoretical framework to explore this.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The primary focus of Bourdieu's theory is "How and under what conditions individuals and groups employ strategies of capital accumulating, investing, and converting various kinds of capital in order to maintain or enhance their positions in the social order" (Swartz, 1997, p.75). The constructs of field, capital, habitus and symbolic system underlie this theory. A field means the network of social relations, and structured systems of social positions within which endless struggles or maneuvers take place over resources, stakes and access. A field is therefore an unstable site where the positions of

agents are merely positions of possibility and reflective of the agents' power (Bourdieu, 1990).

Power, however, is contingent on capital, which is unequally distributed among agents. Differences in capital reflect on how far agents can dominantly play in fields, resulting in inequality and hierarchy in social life. There are three primary forms of capital: economic, cultural and social capital, which are materialized and in embodied forms (Bourdieu, 1986). Economic capital relates to material and financial assets such as money. Cultural capital is attached to bodies of persons and is embodied as knowledge, skills, taste and lifestyles. Objectified cultural capital is in the form of cultural goods, including for example, pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, writings and machines. Institutionalized cultural capital is inherent in the institution or the certificate social, such as titles and academic qualification. Social capital, on the other hand, is linked to a social network that gives mutual acquaintance and recognition to members so that the each member is entitled to credit. A variant of social capital is political capital which has the capacity to yield considerable profits and privileges by operating as patrimonialization of collective resources, including for example political parties and unions (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

Another form of capital, labelled as symbolic capital, arises when economic or cultural capital is known and recognized (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 21). Once any of the three primary forms of capital are deemed legitimated as evidenced by prestige, reputation and personal authority (Everett, 2002, p.63) and consequently transformed into symbolic capital, agents have the power to impose and inculcate on others their vision of society (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 23).

Individual or institutional agents act in a field using capital and habitus. Habitus is an accumulation of historical experiences embodied in agents' mental schemata. The way

agents comprehend and respond to actions and events depends upon their experience of social and economic conditions as embodied in their social status, education and culture (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 19; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p.105). Therefore, habitus functions like culture, pervading and saturating social processes (Everett, 2002). It both rationalizes and reproduces what happens within fields. Habitus is a complex historical trajectory where agents' early experiences shape their current and future practices and actions.

The field is a site where agents act to maintain their position by drawing on capital and habitus. Agents come into a field to contest resources from other agents and impose their own products. Each participating agent will possess a different power and position due to unequally distributed capital. Figure 1 below is a configuration of a field. Each bubble represents an agent endowed with capital and habitus. The bigger the bubble, the more dominant the player in the field. As a field is an unstable site, an agent's position is always moving. This current study seeks to establish that each institution or individual agent possesses different weightings regarding capital and habitus, which influence the power to influence and/or control the Indonesian government accounting field.




Figure 1: The configuration of field

A critical aspect of Bourdieu's theory (1977b) is in the use of symbolic systems to explain how social realities are constructed. A symbolic system resides in fields and performs cognition, communication, and domination functions. Symbolic systems such as myth, language, art and science are instruments of knowledge that construct material worlds. It dominates how agents construct their social reality. The agent's cognition of a symbolic system as knowledge, however, depends on the agent's perception and interpretation. Once an agent develops their cognitive skill to understand knowledge, he/she practices the symbolic system through communication, similar to a person who studies a language where he/she transforms his/her understanding of it through speech. Writing and discourse are examples of outcomes where one masters knowledge. Symbolic systems also serve as instruments of domination when dominant groups or classes³ reinforce other classes to accept the definition of symbolic system that conforms to its interests. Thus, the symbolic system is a cognitive, communication and domination function that has power to create different classes in society.

Field social position represents the extent to which agents comprehend symbolic systems in field. First, agents may accept the symbolic system as *doxa*, which is a set of core values and discourses which a field articulates as its fundamental principles and which tend to be viewed as inherently true and necessary (Webb, et. al. p. xi, 2002). Symbolic system as *doxa* is generated when agents reproduce practices as representations of symbolic systems without question or arbitrariness. Accordingly, there is a quasi-perfect-fit between objective structures and internalized structures to perceive symbolic system as an established political order. Thus symbolic system is taken for granted (Bourdieu, 1977a). In this situation, symbolic system becomes symbolic violence because it is entrenched within the field without resistance. Secondly,

³ Bourdieu believes that the classification of class or group is not only based on homology material properties possessed by members but also it is based on the subjective structure of members, for example, taste and lifestyle. Thus, one is not conditioned in a group but (s)he chooses to be in such a condition (Bourdieu, 1989, 1985).

field is in 'struggle' position when agents struggle to produce power in order to impose their practices toward a symbolic system which is recognized or accepted by others. Indeed, their understanding about symbolic system depends on their possession of capital. Thus, agents struggle to convert their capital into symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1989). Thirdly, field has distinctive position when agents succeed in obtaining recognition from others toward their understanding about the symbolic system. In other words, agents have power to transform their capital into symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1989).

Alawattage (2011) and Malsch, et.al (2011) provide extensive reviews on accounting studies using Bourdieu as a theoretical framework. These studies cover many research areas in accounting including its profession (Neu, et.al, 2003; Everett, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Ramirez, 2001; Haynes, 2008), technologies and governance (Rahaman, et.al, 2007; Neu, et.al, 2008; Neu and Heincke, 2004; Neu and Ocampo, 2007; Neu, 2006, Neu, et.al, 2006; Shenkin and Coulson (2007), academia (Cooper, 2002; Everett, 2004; Everett, 2008; Cooper, et.al, 2005; Green and Everett, 2003; Fogarty, 1998; McPhail (2010), practices (Kurunmaki, 1999, Baxter and Chua, 2008), Hamilton and O hogartaigh (2009), Alawattage (2011), regulation (Ezzamel, et.al, 2007; Xu and Xu, 2008) and policy making (Neu, et.al, 2001).

None of the above studies examine government accounting transformation within the context of sociopolitical change within a transition country. Studies that are closest to the current study are Kurunmaki (1999), Neu and Ocampo (2007) and Neu, et al. (2008), which focus on accounting change in the public sector. Kurunmaki (1999) demonstrates that accounting change in Finnish health care sector arose from competition within various institutions and individuals in Finnish public and university hospitals. While Neu and Ocampo (2007) and Neu, et al. (2008) analyze the role of the World Bank in

diffusing accounting practices to education institutions within the public sector in Latin America. Diffusion is not an automatic process. Financial reform was found to be influenced by the predisposition of national government, the embodied history of institutions and the distribution of capital within both institutions. Both Neu and Ocampo's (2007) and Neu, et.al 's (2008) studies use the theory of field, capital and habitus. Few prior studies have applied field, capital and habitus' together as a cohesive framework (Malsch, et al., 2011, p. 218) to explain transformation in a developing country context. Therefore, this study uses the concept of field, capital and habitus to examine the dynamics of Indonesian government accounting change.

INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING TRANSFORMATION

This section presents a trajectory analysis of government accounting change in Indonesia from the 1960s to 2010. It examines how individuals and institutional agents competed in the field of government accounting. We begin by identifying the agents. Harun and Robinson (2010), Marwata (2008) and Djamhuri (2009) in their analyses of Indonesian government accounting name these agents as donor agencies, ministries/agencies, parliament, State Audit Board, administrative staff and the accounting profession. In addition, former President Suharto was an individual agent who had ability to control state affairs prior to 1998. Our examination is divided into three periods; (1) the period prior to 1998, (2) the transition period from 1998 to 2004 and (3) the post order regime from 2004 to 2010.

Prior to 1998

The field of Indonesian government accounting in this period was a colonial legacy of the Dutch. *Indische Comptabiliteitswet* (ICW) 1925 (later revised by Law No.9/1968) embodied a colonial government accounting system that regulated the government budget, accounting system and auditing. It was designed to account for the production

of Indonesia's natural resources to the Dutch government. A cash based accounting method was applied to both budgeting and accounting systems. The Indonesian government's financial report, called budget calculation notes⁴, was a comparison between budget and the realization of the various expenditure and revenue accounts. It did not present a formal and systematic report on the government's debts and assets. The budget calculation notes were not subject to government oversight. Although the *Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan* (BPK) [State Audit Board] had the legal authority to audit public finance, its *de facto* remit was limited. Mr. Anwar Nasution (2007), a former leader of the BPK, recounts that the BPK had limited audit scope and organization, budget and staff control and the audit report was also not publicly available.

Political conditions within Indonesia were not conducive to calls for government accountability and transparency. The imbalance of power between the legislative and executive is evident in any authoritative regime, and Indonesia was no exception. Under Indonesia's constitution, *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR) [the People Consultative Assembly], the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR) [House of Representative] held legislative power and the president was the head of the executive branch. However, effective separation of powers for state governance (*trias politica*) did not exist in Indonesia, as *Golkar* held the majority (more than 60%) of seats in parliament during the regime of Suharto (Liddle, 1999, p.41). *Golkar* was the partisan political face of the state bureaucracy and Suharto was directly involved in *Golkar's* organization and policies from the beginning of the New Order. His powers extended to having ultimate authority to choose the head of *Golkar* (Liddle, 1999 and Malley, 1999). The former authoritarian regime overarched its power to determine regulations covering parliament and its assembly, elections, opposition parties, media, interest groups and other organizations. Official control over the party system was pervasive and intrusive. Only three entities were permitted to contest the elections; the state party, called

⁴ The example of government financial report prior to reform period can be seen on the state budget calculation note for the fiscal year 1992/1993

Functional Group (*Golkar*), the Development Unity Party (PPP), and the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI). Once every five years, all public employees were mobilized to vote for *Golkar*. Officials were effectively prohibited from joining either of the other two parties. Civil servants and retired military officers were recruited to lead *Golkar* nationally, and at the provincial and local levels (Liddle, 1999, pp.40-41). These political conditions resulted in a paralysis of the legislative branch, given the power of state control exercised by the President's, and supported by the military. There were no effective checks and balances between the executive and the legislative branches, which should have occurred under the constitution.

As the all powerful state dictated economic structure, it was argued transparency was not needed. During the New Order⁵ era, President Suharto ruled that the state had a legitimate economic role to determine the operations of the market, which must be tempered by social objectives (Hadiz, 2001, p. 128). Therefore, the state had full control of trade and the exploitation of natural resources. The military was used as an entity by which to dominate and manage revenues from resources exploitation, for example in metals and oil mining (Robison, 1981, p. 24). Besides the state and military domination of resources, the state controlled business through patronage. Suharto family members and their associates dominated business in the flour-milling, cement, airlines, forestry and banking industries (Habir, 1999 and Hadiz, 2001).

During this period, corruption in Indonesia was endemic. Its mode varied, ranging from paying above formal user charges for basic government services, securing licenses and concessions for natural monopolies, violating rules and regulations including tax avoidance, bidding for lucrative official positions in the state bureaucracy, passing laws to benefit certain areas; to selecting high ranking government officials in the Parliament

⁵ The New Order was established in 1966 by a coalition of anticommunist forces led by General Suharto, who governed Indonesia until his resignation in 1998 (Hafidz, 2004, p.229)

(Nasution, 2008). According to Transparency International⁶, Indonesia was #2 on the corruption perceptions index in 1998. A perfect 10 is indicative of a totally corruption free country. The score reflects the degree to which corruption is perceived by business people.

Given the widespread corruption and undemocratic political conditions, accounting, as a social tool, did not play a role in delivering transparency and accountability. Many funds were presented as 'off-budget accounts', and as a result it was difficult to scrutinize the use of funds efficiently and effectively. One example was the 'reforestation fund'⁷.

The Indonesian accounting profession was at a distance in the government accounting field. The World Bank report on Accounting Development Project I (1988-1995) indicated that the *Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia* (IAI) [Indonesian Institute of Accountants] was not involved in the development of the government accounting project; instead, being responsible for developing accounting within the private sector. The IAI was structurally and financially weak. It relied on the central government for funding given it had only 4,900 members in a population of over 200 million (The World Bank, 1996). In other words, the profession lacked both economic and cultural capital, highlighting its weakness in facilitating change.

Whilst the concept of 'new public management' had been developing globally, Indonesia preserved its traditional accounting system. Accounting, as a symbolic

⁶ Transparency International, the global civil society organization leading the fight against corruption, brings people together in a powerful worldwide coalition to end the devastating impact of corruption on men, women and children around the world.

⁷ Reforestation fund was established in 1980 by presidential decree. All concessionaires were required to pay US\$4.00 per cubic meter per swan wood/plywood and US\$.50 per cubic meter of chip wood. The funds were to be used toward reforestation or refunded if the concessionaires undertook the reforestation. Prior to 1998, the allocation of reforestation funds was not transparent. It has been reported that in 1993, Rp. 400 billion was transferred to the *Industri Penerbangan Terbang Nurtanio* (Indonesian Aerospace) to support development of a national airplane (The World Bank, 1998, p. 44).

system for accountability and transparency, was not present within the field of government accounting in Indonesia at the time. Accounting was perceived as being associated with administrative compliance. This cognitive perspective on accounting was prevalent within Indonesia's sociopolitical structure for many years; consequently a cultural unconsciousness existed as to accountings wider role. Although the World Bank tried to assist the Indonesian government in developing and modernising its accounting system during the period 1988-2000, the project failed to introduce a consolidated financial report for the 27 provinces across its archipelago (The World Bank, 1996 and 2001). The Bank had intended to change the Indonesian government accounting system toward the application of double entry bookkeeping and balance sheet accounting, with the government financial report being presented to Parliament and its ministries and agencies. However the government expressed no intention in changing from the cash basis of accounting. The *Badan Akuntansi Keuangan Negara* (BAKUN)⁸ [Central Accounting Office] concurred with the view that the decision to develop a double entry accounting system was made at the urging of the World Bank, while the government was half-hearted in supporting this effort prior to 2000 (The World Bank, 2001). Marwata and Alam's (2006) study reveals that although BAKUN made efforts to create a draft of governmental accounting standards in the early 1990s, these were halted because the President did not want to have accounting standards by which certain aspects of government finance's could be judged and questioned. Therefore, accounting within Indonesia's public sector failed as a management and accountability tool.

Thus, the matrix of Indonesian government accounting prior the reform period was dominated by the President. The President, through his political party *Golkar*, was entrenched in parliament, and as a result there was no need to demonstrate accountability from the executive with respect to the compilation or use of the budget.

⁸ A unit of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) established to prepare financial reporting (The World Bank, 1996)

The president through his political party was too strong. The ability to abuse the system and monopolize both economic and cultural capital, resulted in the achievement of symbolic capital whereby his leadership was accepted as doxa by the legislative function (parliament), and the institutions it oversaw, including the specific body charged with overseeing budgeting spending; the state audit board. Accounting was seen as an administrative activity, not as a mechanism for accountability and transparency. The absence of accountability enjoyed by government ended in 1998 after Indonesia faced devastating economic conditions following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. This crisis and instability provided the impetus for donor agencies to compel that accounting be viewed and used as a tool for accountability and transparency. The position, influence and strength of donor agencies became more prominent.

The financial crisis began when on the 21 July 1997 the Rupiah depreciated from Rp. 2,540 to Rp. 2,700/\$ (Lindblad, 1997, p.4). GDP growth was only 1.4% at the end of 1997 (Johnson, 1998, p. 15) following years of unprecedented growth as an 'Asian Tiger'. The severe economic conditions led the Indonesian government to ask for debt financing from the International Monetary Fund to overcome the economic hardships that were ensuing (Blondal, 2009, p.2). The IMF's \$43 billion aid package was conditioned on the Indonesian government reforming its economic and financial structures (Emmerson, 1999, p. 324). The Managing Director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, stated that the Indonesian government should commit to conducting three aspects of reform, namely adjusting monetary and fiscal policies, restructuring the financial sector, and deregulating trade policies in order to meet efficiency. Simultaneously the government should promote transparency and openness. The latest point was clarified in a Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies dated October 31, 1997:

"To ensure the quality and durability of the fiscal reform, the government intends to move to a comprehensive and transparent system to report on the public sector fiscal position...Consolidated accounts will be prepared for revenues, expenditures,

the overall balance, and financing for public sector, including central government and financial and nonfinancial enterprises...”

The following section outlines how the Ministry of Finance reformed government accounting during the transition period that followed.

The Transition Period (1998-2004)

The matrix of the field of government accounting changed when the new public accountability system was introduced during the reform period. Donor agencies pressured for the introduction of the accrual accounting method in Indonesia, which in turn became cultural capital. This is evidenced in the strategic plan document (The White Paper) prepared by a World Bank funded project, the Government Financial Management and Revenue Administration Project (GFRMAP) (The Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia, 2001). Donor agencies subsequently defined other projects and provided assistance through the allocation of further economic and cultural capital, which legitimized the new public accountability system, thereby elevating it into a symbolic system (see Appendix 1 and 2).

The Ministry of Finance, being the main recipient of the economic capital of donor agencies, was the primary agent required to change the field of government accounting. The Ministry issued a range of government regulations from 2002⁹ which saw significant modifications in the government financial report, which now consisted of a budget realization statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement. The initiative was

⁹ It can be seen on the Keputusan-09/Ak/2002 [Head of BAKUN regulation]: accounting guideline for government assets at departments/institutions, Keputusan-10/Ak/2002 [Head of BAKUN regulation]: preparation of departments/institutions balance sheet, Keputusan-11/Ak/2002 [Head of BAKUN regulation]: guideline for preparing budget realization statement and balance sheet at departments/institutions for 2002, keputusan-07/Ak/2003 [Head of BAKUN regulation]: guideline for ministries/institutions financial reporting preparation for the year 2003, Keputusan-11/Ak/2003 [Head of BAKUN regulation]: technical guideline for government asset accounting at ministries/institutions, Keputusan-16/2004 [Head of BAKUN regulation]: guideline for ministries/institutions financial reporting preparation for the year 2004

successful as the Indonesian government was able to finally present a central government financial report¹⁰ in 2004, which consolidated the financial reports of all of the ministries and related government agencies. Another change was the shift from a 'cash' basis to 'cash toward accrual' basis method, a bridging method before the adoption of a 'full accrual' accounting. The balance sheet allowed government to present a complete asset listing at net worth, which excluded contingent liabilities. However, during this transition period, large revenue and expenditure accounts continued to use the cash accounting method.

During the transition period, donor agencies encouraged other branches of the Indonesian government to engage with the field of government accounting. To illustrate, the World Bank in collaboration with the IMF and AUSAID (The Australian Agency for International Development)¹¹ implemented an adaptable program loan to strengthen the role of parliament in both the *ex ante* review of the budget and *ex post* analysis of budget. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) distributed economic capital to other government audit agencies including the *Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan* (BPK) [The State Audit Board], inspectorate generals, *Badan Pengawasan Daerah* (BAWASDAs, regional internal audit bodies), and *Badan Pengawasan Keuangan Dan Pembangunan* (BPKP, government internal auditors) to strengthen the Indonesian state audit function at various levels - internal and external and as well as central and regional (ADB, 2010). The ADB, in partnership with local universities sought to invest in cultural capital by developing the accounting skills of government internal auditors.¹² The ADB also distributed both economic and cultural capital to a newly created agency, the Commission for Eradication of Corruption, to equip the commission with the skills to carry out investigations, interrogations, and prosecutions; supervise other agencies; and monitor corruption within Indonesian society (ADB, 2005). Other international donors

¹⁰ It can be seen on the central government financial report for the year 2004 (<http://www.perbendaharaan.go.id/gambar/LKPP2004.pdf>)

¹¹ http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/PoliticalEconomy/PREMCourse07/Amit%20background%20material/040406_TOR_DPR%20Diagnostic_BB%20and%20AusAid_final.pdf

¹² The accreditation report of Airlangga University's magister accounting program for year 2010

such as USAID (the United States Agency for International Development) assisted in creating cultural capital amongst Indonesian public servants by establishing the Local Governance Support Program¹³ to strengthen the core competencies of local administrations and the capacity of democratic governance institutions such as local legislative councils and the local civil service (USAID, 2009). International Organizations such as HIVOS (the Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation) and the Ford Foundation also injected economic capital into Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW Annual Report, 2009 and 2010); a Non-Government Organization (NGO) established during the reform period (June 1998) by a number of concerned lawyers and NGO activists to support the creation of a clean bureaucratic, political and economic system.¹⁴

Thus, there was a concerted effort by international donor agencies to transform not only the field of government accounting but also the much larger field of the political fabric of Indonesian society. Economic and cultural capital was injected in an attempt to break the habitus of corruption that pervaded all levels of government. The position of donor agencies was strongest during this period. Accrual accounting, in particular, can be viewed as cultural capital and a means to attain accountability and transparency within the field of government accounting. On the other hand, the Indonesian state and the position of its agencies were weakened as they relinquished the field of government accounting to donor agencies.

Once governmental institutions agreed to be part of the new government accounting field, one would expect their subsequent actions would embrace the value of accountability and transparency in government. The post reform period will illustrate

¹³ A \$61.8 million-project of the USAID/Indonesia Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) to support expanding participatory, effective and accountable governance" through an integrated set of assistance activities engaged with local governments (LGs), legislative councils, and civil society organizations (CSOs) during March 2005 to September 2009.

¹⁴ (<http://www.hivos.nl>)

how the agents applied their newly acquired economic and cultural capital in the field of government accounting.

The Post Reform Period (2004-2010)

The configuration of the field of government accounting was fluid in the post-reform period. The government issued an accounting standard based on the accrual accounting method, although it gave allowances for certain ministries/agencies in order to adjust to accrual accounting within a four year period (Simanjuntak, 2010). Indonesia, therefore, was still in a transition period in fully applying accrual accounting. Emphasizing the technical aspects of accounting is only part of reform. The most significant is on how Indonesia's culture is willing to embrace accountability and transparency as a key outcome of the government accounting process.

In the post-reform period, donor agencies retreated to their previous role. Local institutional players on the other hand, recently endowed with new capital and ideas, consolidated their power and safeguarded and maintained their position in the field. Did this indicate that real reform did not occur and that the various players failed to share the same understanding of the role of government accounting in the new political landscape? In this section, each local player will be identified and examined with regard to its capital and habitus and subsequent power.

The Parliament

The Indonesian parliament emerged during the reform period as a player with real power as it was given the task to legislate and, oversee the government budget. However, parliament was unable to uphold the value of a democratic, accountable and transparent government system despite it being equipped with cultural capital by international donor agencies in the preceding reform period. Importantly, it continued

to reside in its habitus of corruption and mismanagement. Eighteen members of both the parliament and the House Councils continued to be involved in cases of corruption (ICW Annual Report, 2009). One Member of Parliament received a bribe for the conversion of conservation forests in Sumatra¹⁵ and a lawmaker was accused of receiving monetary bribes in exchange for voting for a senior position at the central bank.¹⁶

However, there was evidence of the new habitus emerging in certain areas of the legislative arena. Member of Parliament Eva Kusuma Sundari, who was also a member of *Tim Kajian Peningkatan Kinerja DPR*¹⁷ [The parliament's performance improvement team], criticized parliament for its overall inability to manage public finances. She publicly declared that parliament failed to respond to a State Audit Board finding that Rp. 25 trillion (approx US \$2.9 billion) was unaccounted for¹⁸ (Kompas, 10 March, 2008).

The State Audit Board (BPK)

The BPK was another player which appeared to embrace the value of accountability and transparency as a symbolic system for government accounting. This was, however, conditional on it continuing to be an independent institution which supervised government. The BPK was far more successful in creating a symbolic system of accountability under the leadership of Anwar Nasution, a professor of economics, during the period 2004 to 2009. Under his tenure, the BPK had enough power to steer the government toward improved transparency and accountability. It did so by delivering disclaimer audit opinions on the government financial report for the years 2004 to 2008 and to press for the government to respond to all aspects of its audit

¹⁵ Al Amin faces multiple charges, Irawaty Wardany, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta Wed, 08/27/2008

¹⁶ Prosecutors Seek 3 Years for BI Bribery Case Suspects, Nivell Rayda, May 05, 2010, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com>

¹⁷ Tim Kajian Peningkatan Kinerja DPR RI functioned to map the parliament's problem and to recommend for overcoming the problems (Sekretariat DPR RI and the UNDP, 2009). However, this team was liquidated after 2009 (Republika.co.id).

¹⁸ 'DPR Semakin Jauh dari Rakyat [DPR is getting far from people], Kompas Newspaper, 10 March. 2008

findings and suggestions¹⁹. The BPK endorsed accrual accounting as a means toward accountability and transparency by rewarding government institutions that performed well financially (Warta BPK, 2009).

The Ministries/Agencies

Government gradually recognized its new accounting system. According to the BPK audit report on the government financial report for the 2008 year (The BPK, 2009), there were an increasing number of government financial reports for both departments and local government that received unqualified audit opinion. However, there were still a relatively large number of departments (30 of 83) and local governments (217 of 293) also receiving qualified audit opinions. Therefore the financial report appears to be a symbol to comply with the new regulations. It had not been solidified as a tool to supervise government by specifically identifying budget corruption involving senior officers of government (ICW annual report, 2009), which would lead to prosecution. Thus, it means the government has not fully perceived accounting as a symbol of accountability and transparency.

The civil service

The civil service has a history of unprofessional practice and regime patronage. Public human resource management has traditionally been poorly managed (The United Nations, 2005 and Prasodjo, 2006) and corruption by government employees has been endemic, mainly through illegal levies from public service customers (Prasodjo, 2006). Despite its history, the bureaucracy appears hesitant to reform. There were government institutions that had still not proposed a bureaucracy review plan, including The House Secretary²⁰. Moreover, Indonesian bureaucracy continues to favor secrecy over transparency. In mid 2010, the ICW conducted a study to test the readiness of public

¹⁹ Indonesian auditors reject govt's 2005 budget accounts, ANTARA News, 4 October 2006

²⁰ *Reformasi Birokrasi Di Pusat Ditargetkan Selesai 2014* [Bureaucracy Reform targeted finish 2014], Antara News, 6 April 2011

institutions in nine regions to comply with the public information law. In the study, public institutions failed to provide information and predominantly gave negative responses regarding information related to budgeting. As a response to the study, the Central Information Commission concluded that most officials continued to believe that withholding information from the public was legitimate and that the public, in general, was largely unaware of its right to access state information. Information on budgets was sensitive and government officials might be afraid that the information they published could result in corruption charges being laid against them.²¹

The Independent Corruption Commission

The Indonesian Government has established the *Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* (KPK) [Corruption Eradication Commission], an independent statutory body. The KPK has uncovered a number of corruption cases involving legislators and government officials, which has led to calls for its disbandment. An ICW coordinator of the law division and court monitoring said that there were two efforts to delegitimize KPK, which would weaken its authority to combat corruption through the promulgation of new regulations²². Steps to deregulate the KPK arose from both the House and Government. A Member of Parliament, who opposed the bill to deregulate KPK, confided that the idea of revoking the rights of KPK was initiated by a number of legislators. However, a representative from the *Golkar Party*, said that it was a government's draft that had sparked controversy as it contained a stipulation that the authority to prosecute only lies in the hand of prosecutors under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General's Office.²³ Given that both the government and parliament had taken a strong position against the KPK, this indicates that both institutions were not able to understand the value of accountability and transparency.

²¹ Bureaucracy an instrument of secrecy: Activists, The Jakarta Post, 22 June 2010

²² *Icw: Upaya Pelemahan Kpk Masih Terus Terjadi* [ICW: Effort to weaken KPK is still ongoing], Antara News, 6 April 2011

²³ House, govt in blame game on weakening of the KPK, The Jakarta Post, 11 September 2009

The Anti-corruption NGO

Two examples of Indonesian anti corruption non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are *Indonesia Corruption Watch* and *Transparency International Indonesia*.²⁴ These organizations have solid reputations²⁵ in combating corruption and actively lobbying government on the need for accountability and transparency. These organizations consist of intellectuals and activists, who are able to articulate and prescribe the logical practice of accounting as a symbol of accountability and transparency.

The Profession

The accounting profession has faced difficulties in asserting its power in the field of government accounting. Its role as a government accounting standard setter has historically been under the influence of the prevailing government (Marwata and Alam, 2006). Moreover, the former leader of the accounting profession, declared that the profession had limited financial and human resources; more specifically, the economic and cultural capital to meet its growing role in the public sector.²⁶ The current IAI leader is a senior academic as well as a senior government official, implying a greater future linkage and co-ordination between the profession and the public sector in standard setting and policy making. However this will involve greater dependency by the IAI on the government, which may compromise independence.

Based on the analysis above, the matrix of government accounting in Indonesia changed after the reform period. Additional players such as the ICW, Transparency International Indonesia and the KPK became involved in the field as stakeholders of the accounting system. In applying Bourdieu, those institutions aim to provide an alternate

²⁴ Transparency International Indonesia (TII) is a *chapter of* Transparency International which global network NGO to promote transparency, accountability to state institutions, political parties, business and civil society.

²⁵ ICW has 16th rank for Transparency and Good Governance Think Tanks from survey: The Think tanks of civil societies program, University of Pennsylvania, USA, ICW Annual Report 2010

²⁶ INTERVIEW: Moving forward against the odds, *The Accountant*, 30 September 2006

voice to government, in shaping reform of both the financial and governance systems within Indonesia. Apart from these institutional players enhancing their cultural capital, agents within each institution were better able to understand the value of accountability and transparency. It was difficult to change the previous habitus that was supportive of secrecy, which ultimately fuelled corruption. The field of Indonesian government accounting has not achieved a significant level of symbolic capital which is representative of the institutions/agents within it, and accordingly accounting is not fully perceived as a symbol of accountability and transparency, and remains a struggle for the various actors that are supportive of a change to a more open system.

CONCLUSION

This current study has found that there was a movement of position in the Indonesia government accounting field through the three periods under analysis. Prior to 1998, the field was monopolized by the President as the political landscape in Indonesia was dominated by a singular political party under the auspices of the President. During the reform period, donor agencies became more prominent within the field as the government needed support as the result of the Asian financial crisis. The configuration of the Indonesian government accounting field became richer when there were roles for institutions such as certain NGO's and independent commission that had responsibilities to oversee government bodies. Traditional and contemporary players including parliament, ministries/agencies, the state audit board, civil service, the independent corruption commission, the anti-corruption NGO and the accounting profession struggled to safeguard and maintain their positions in the new field of accounting based on their existing perceptions and roles toward accounting. These players did not totally understand, perceive and accept accounting as a symbol of accountability and transparency while accounting. Instead it was seen as administrative compliance prior to the reform period.

Regardless of the donor agencies injecting economic and cultural capital in order for Indonesia to apply accounting as accountability and managerial tool, it was difficult to break the existing habitus that favors secrecy and fosters corruptive behavior. From a Bourdieun perspective, Indonesia has not accepted accounting as doxa, and as a result accounting has not been legitimated in within the Indonesian sociopolitical structure. Accordingly, there is an imbalance between capital, habitus and field within the Indonesian accounting framework. Capital endowed by the players was not enough to break and change the existing habitus, despite the field having moved to attain the value of accountability and transparency.

This current study echoes previous studies which conclude that changes in government accounting are difficult to implement, especially within transition countries. Implementation does not only require well developed materialized forms of capital, but it also requires embodied forms of capital such as knowledge. Moreover, accrual accounting implementation needs a robust monitoring and oversight mechanism; Legislative ability to call the executive branch to account, and an active and pervasive consciousness to utilize accounting information in the management of public sector affairs. This study supports Hepworth's (2003) statement that accounting reform needs a willingness culturally to accept reform, the technical ability to understand and implement reform, and to maintain it once introduced.

This study surmises that government accounting can be a pedagogic tool for transitional countries to understand the meaning of accountability, fiscal control and public sector management. Government accounting teaches countries to be more open, democratic and transparent. It is not only a process of knowledge development, but more importantly it is a process to change habitus *viz* culture. This conclusion underlines Neu and Ocampo's (2007) and Neu, et al' s (2008) studies that accounting

change within developing countries is not an automatic process, but attempts at change influence the distribution of capital within fields, and resistance to change hinders it.

Changing habitus requires time and sustained capital that endorses the value of accountability and transparency within the government accounting field. Through the process of understanding, perceiving and accepting accounting as a tool for accountability and managerial, habitus can be shifted and can become coherent with value in the field. Further research may explore how habitus evolves to accept accounting as accountability and transparency, when implementing new forms of government accounting.

Appendix 1:

Examples of The World Bank Projects in Indonesia supporting public sector reform

No	The World Bank Project and its recipient
1	Public Expenditure Analysis and Capacity Harmonization (PEACH) Grant to Indonesia BAKTI on Communication & Outreach (Bursa Kawasan Timur Indonesia)
2	Local Government and Decentralization Project (Ministry Of Finance)
3	Initiatives for Local Governance Reform Project (Ministry Of Home Affairs, Directorate General of Regional Autonomy)
4	Government Financial Management and Revenue Administration Project (Ministry of Finance)
5	Public Expenditure Support Facility (DPL-DDO) (Ministry of Finance & Coordination Ministry of Economic Affairs)
6	Corruption and Legal Reform Government of Indonesia
7	Policy Reform Support Loan Project (02) (Ministry of Finance)
8	Corporate Restructuring Technical Assistance Project (Jakarta Initiative Task Force-JITF)
9	Policy Reform Support Loan Project
10	BEPEKA Audit Modernization Project
11	Accountancy Development Project
12	Accountancy Development Project (Ministry Of Finance and Ministry Of Education)
13	Indonesia: Scholarships Program for Strengthening Reforming Institutions (Ministry Of National Development Planning-Bappenas)

Source: The World Bank <http://web.worldbank.org/>

Appendix 2:

Examples of The Asian Development Bank Projects in Indonesia supporting public sector reform

No	The Asian Development Bank Projects Name (Recipient)
1	Strengthening National Public Procurement Processes (National Public Procurement Agency)
2	Second Local Government Finance and Governance Reform Program (Directorate General Fiscal Balance)
3	Local Government Finance and Governance Reform (Directorate General Fiscal Balance)
4	Public Expenditure Support Facility Program (Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs)
5	Improving Efficiency of Public Financial Management
6	Pro-Poor Planning and Budgeting Technical
7	Fourth Development Policy Support Program
8	Local Government Financing
9	Fifth Development Policy Support Program Ordinary Capital Resources
10	State Audit Reform Sector Program
11	Support for the Local Government Performance Measurement System
12	Support for the Implementation of the State Audit Reform Investment
13	Support for the Implementation of the State Audit Reform Program
14	Sustainable Capacity Building for Decentralization
15	Strengthening the Capacity of the Commission for Eradication of Corruption in Indonesia
16	Strengthening the Capacity of the Ministry of Settlements and Regional Infrastructure to Combat Fraud and Corruption
17	Support to the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia
18	Supporting Country Financial Accountability
19	Strengthening Procurement Policies, Legal Framework, and Institutions
20	Improving Public Sector Procurement
21	Establishment of an Anticorruption Commission

Source: <http://www.adb.org/Projects/>

References:

- Alawattage, C., (2011). 'The Calculative Reproduction of Social Structures- The Field of Gem Mining in Sri Lanka'. *Critical Perspective on Accounting*, Vol.2 (1).
- Anderson, B.R.O.G., (2006). *Java in a time of revolution: occupation and resistance: 1944-1946*. Jakarta: PT Equinox Publishing Indonesia.
- Bailey, Derek; Alver, Jaan; Mackevicius, Jonas; Paupa, Vilma (1995), Accounting law reform in the Baltic states: the initial steps, *European Accounting Review*, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 685 – 711.
- Barton, Allan D. (2000) Accounting For Public Heritage Facilities ± Assets Or Liabilities Of The Government?, *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, Vol. 13 No. 2, Pp. 219-235.
- Baxter, J. and Chua, W.F., (2008). 'Be(com)ing the chief financial officer of an organisation: Experimenting with Bourdieu's practice theory'. *Management Accounting Research*, 19:212-230.
- Benson, Rodney (2006), News Media as a Journalistic Field: what Bourdieu adds to New Institutionalism and Vice versa, *Political Communication*, 23 (2), pp. 187-201
- Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L.J.D., (1992). *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Bourdieu, P., (1977a). *Outline of a Theory of Practice* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, P., (1977b). 'Symbolic Power'. In: Gleeson, D. (ed). *Identity and Structure: Issues in the Sociology of Education*. Nafferton: Nafferton Books.
- Bourdieu, P., (1985). 'Social Space and the Genesis of Groups'. *Theory and Society*, 14 (6 (November)):723-744.
- Bourdieu, P., (1986). 'The Forms of Capital'. In: Richardson, J.G. (ed). *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Bourdieu, P., (1989). 'Social Space and Symbolic Power'. *Sociological Theory*, 7 (1 (June)):18-26.
- Bourdieu, P., (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Caperchione, Eugenio and Mussari, Riccardo (2002), Government budgeting and accounting reforms in Italy, *Models of Public Budgeting and Accounting Reform: OECD Journal on budgeting*, Vol. 2/Supplement 1, Paris.
- Carlin, T.M., (2005). 'Debating the Impact of Accrual Accounting and Reporting in the Public Sector'. *Financial Accountability & Management*, 21 (3).
- Carpenter, V.L. and Feroz, E.H. (2001), Institutional theory and accounting rule choice: an analysis of four US state governments' decisions to adopt generally accepted accounting principles, *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 26, pp. 565-596.
- Chan, J.L., (1997). 'Accounting and Financial Management reform in the United States Government: An Application of Professor Luder's Contingency Model'. *Perspectives on Performance Measurement and Public Sector Accounting*. Bern, Switzerland: Paul Haupt Publishers, 17-41.

- Christensen, M., (2002). 'Accrual Accounting in the Public Sector: in the Case of the New South Wales Government'. *Accounting History*, 7:93-124.
- Connoly, Ciaran and Hyndman, Noel (2006), The actual implementation of accruals accounting: caveats from a case within the UK public sector, *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 272-289
- Cooper, C., (2002). 'Critical Accounting in Scotland'. *Critical Perspective on Accounting*, 13:451-462.
- Cooper, D.J. and Robson, K., (2006). 'Accounting, professions and regulation: Locating the sites of professionalization'. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 31:415-444.
- Cooper, D.J., (1994). 'Expanding the Horizon of Research on Accounting Education'. *Contemporary Accounting Research*, Special Education Research Issue:163-177.
- Cooper, D.J., Everett, J. and Neu, D., (2005). 'Financial Scandals, Accounting Change and the Role of Accounting Academics: A Perspective from North America'. *European Accounting Review*, 14 (2):373-382.
- DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W., (1991). 'The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields'. In: Powell, W.W. and DiMaggio, P.J. (eds). *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Djamhuri, A., (2009). 'A Case Study of Governmental Accounting and Budgeting Reform at Local Authority in Indonesia: An Institutional Perspective'. Univesiti Sains Malaysia. .
- El-Batanoni, K. and Jones, R.H., (1996). 'Governmental Accounting in Sudan'. *Research in Governmental Nonprofit Accounting*, 9:209-217.
- Everett, J. (2004), "Exploring (false) dualisms for environmental accounting praxis", *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, Vol. 15 No. 8, pp. 1061-84.
- Everett, J., (2002). 'Organizational Research and the Praxeology of Pierre Bourdieu'. *Organizational Research Methods*, 5:56.
- Everett, J., (2003). 'The politics of comprehensive auditing in fields of high outcome and cause uncertainty'. *Critical Perspective on Accounting*, 14:77-104.
- Everett, J., (2008). 'Editorial Proximity Equals Publication Success: A Function of Rational Self-Interest of Good-Faith Economy?'. *Critical Perspective on Accounting*, 19 (8):1149-1176.
- Ezzamel, M., Zezhong Xiao, J., Pan, A. (2007), Political ideology and accounting regulation in China, *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 32 (7/8), pp. 669-700.
- Foggarty, T.J., (1998). 'The Stratification of Academic Accounting in USA: a Theoretical and Empirical Evaluation of Institutional Reproduction'. *Accounting Education*, 7 (1):3-20.
- Gillies J, Leimann J, Peterson R (2002), Making a successful transition from a command to a market economy: The lessons from Estonia, *Corporate Governance*, 10, pp. 175-186
- Godfrey, A.D., Devlin, P.J. and Merrouche, M.C., (1996). 'Governmental Accounting in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. *Research in Governmental Nonprofit Accounting*, 9:193-208.

- Godfrey, A.D., Devlin, P.J. and Merrouche, M.C., (2000). 'Government Accounting Development within a Transitional Economy-Albania a case study'. *The Journal of Applied Accounting Research*, 5 (III):52-85.
- Green, D.L. and Everett, J., (2003). 'Accounting Education and the Reproduction of the Accounting Profession'. *Research Seminar The University of New South Wales, School of Accounting*.
- Haldma, T. and Jõgi, H., (2006). 'Contextual Factors and Motivators of the Accounting Developments in Estonian Local Governments'. *14th Scientific Conference on Economic Policy*. Tartu - Värska: Berlin, Tallinn: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Mattimar, 443 - 456.
- Hamilton, G. and hogartaigh, C.O., (2009). 'The third policeman: the true and fair view, language and the habitus of accounting'. *Critical Perspective on Accounting*, 20:910-920.
- Harun, H. and Robinson, P., (2010). 'The adoption of accrual accounting in the Indonesian public sector'. In: Tsamenyi, P.M. and Uddin, P.S. (eds). *Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies*: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 233-250.
- Haynes, K. (2008), "(Re)figuring accounting and maternal bodies: the gendered embodiment of accounting professionals", *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 33 No. 4/5, pp. 328-48.
- Hellman, J. and Kaufmann, D. (2001), *Confronting the challenge of state capture in transition economies*, *Finance and Development: A Quarterly magazine of the IMF*, Vol. 38, No. 3, September.
- Hepworth, N., (2003). 'Preconditions for Successful Implementation of Accrual Accounting in Central Government'. *Public Money & Management*, January.
- IFAC, (2003a). 'International Public Sector Accounting Standard: Financial Reporting Under the Cash Basis of Accounting'.
- IFAC, (2003b). 'Public Sector Committee: Study no 14: Transition to the Accrual Basis of Accounting: Guidance for Governments and Government Entities'.
- IFAC, (2008). 'IPSAS Adoption by Governments'. *September*.
- Jackson, A. and Lapsley, I. (2003) *The Diffusion Of Accounting Practices In The New "Managerial" Public Sector*, *The International Journal Of Public Sector Management*, Vol. 16 No. 5, Pp. 359-372
- Jacobs, K., (2003). 'Class reproduction in professional recruitment: examining the accounting profession'. *Critical Perspective on Accounting*, 14:569-596.
- James, O. and Manning, N., (1996). 'Public Management Reform: A Global Perspective'. *Politics*, 16 (3):143-149.
- Jorge, S.M., (2005). 'The Reform of Governmental Accounting in Portugal: An Application of Luder's Contingency Model. In: Bourmistrov, A. and Mellembvik, F. (eds). *International Trends and Experiences in Government Accounting of the 9th CIGAR Conference*. Norway: Bodo Graduate School of Business.
- Khan, A. and Mayes, S., (2009). *Transition to accrual accounting*: International Monetary Fund.

- Kurunmaki, L., (1999). 'Professional vs financial capital in the field of health care- struggles for the redistribution of power and control'. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 24:95-124.
- Luder, K. and Jones, R., (2003). 'The Diffusion of Accrual Accounting and Budgeting in European Governments- A Cross-Country Analysis'. In: Luder, K. and Jones, R. (eds). *Reforming Governmental Accounting and Budgeting in Europe* Frankfurt-am-Main: Fachverlag Moderne Wirtschaft, 1-57.
- Luder, K., (2002). 'Research in Comparative Governmental Accounting over the Last Decade-Achievements and Problems'. In: Montesinos, V. and Vela, J.M. (eds). *Innovations in Governmental Accounting*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publisher.
- Luder, K.G., (1992). 'A Contingency Model of Governmental Accounting Innovations in the Political-Administrative Environment'. *Research in Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting*, 7:99-127.
- Malsch, B., Gendron, Y. and Grazzini, F., (2011). 'Investigating interdisciplinary translations: The influence of Pierre Bourdieu on accounting literature'. *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal*, 24 (2):194-228.
- Marwata, (2008). 'Doctoral Research abstract: understanding governmental accounting change in developing country context the case of accrual-based accounting systems adoption by Indonesian local government'. *Journal of accounting and Organizational Change*, 4 (1).
- McKendrick, J., (2007). 'Modernization of the Public Accounting Systems in Central and Eastern European Countries: the Case of Romania'. *International Public Management Review*, 8 (1):168-185.
- McPhail, K., Paisey, C. and Paisey, N.J., (2010). 'Class, social deprivation and accounting education in Scottish schools: Implications for the reproduction of the accounting profession and practice'. *Critical Perspective on Accounting*, 21:31-50.
- Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B., (1991). 'Institutionalized organizations: Formal structures as myth and ceremony'. In: Powell, W.W. and DiMaggio, P.J. (eds). *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 41-62.
- Montesinos, Vicente (2002), Government budgeting and accounting reforms in Spain, *Models of Public Budgeting and Accounting Reform: OECD Journal on budgeting*, Vol. 2/Supplement 1, Paris.
- Neu, D. and Heincke, M. (2004), "The subaltern speaks: financial relations and the limits of governmentality", *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 179-206.
- Neu, D. and Ocampo, E., (2007). 'Doing missionary work: the World Bank and the diffusion of financial practices'. *Critical Perspective on Accounting*, 18.
- Neu, D., (2006). 'Accounting for Public Space'. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 31:391-414.
- Neu, D., Cooper, D.J. and Everett, J., (2001). 'Critical Accounting Interventions'. *Critical Perspective on Accounting*, 12:735-762

- Neu, D., Friesen, C. and Everett, J. (2003), "The changing internal market for ethical discourses in the Canadian CA profession", *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 70-103.
- Neu, D., Gomez, E.O., Graham, C. and Heincke, M., (2006). "'Informing" Technologies and the World Bank'. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 31:635-662.
- Neu, D., Silva, L. and Gomez, E.O., (2008). 'Diffusing financial practices in Latin American higher education: Understanding the intersection between global influence and the local context'. *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, 21 (1).
- Oakes, L.S. Townley, B., Cooper D.J. (1998), *Business Planning as Pedagogy: Language and Control in a Changing Institutional Field*, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 2, Special Issue: Critical Perspectives on Organizational Control, June, pp. 257-292.
- Oliorilanto, R.H., (2008). 'Contingency Factors Affecting the Adoption of Accrual Accounting in Malagasy Municipalities'. *International Journal of Governmental Financial Management*, VIII (1):37-50.
- Painter, Martin (2003), *Public administration reform in Vietnam: problems and prospects*, *Public Administration and Development*, Volume 23, Issue 3, pages 259-271.
- Pallot, J., (1996). 'Innovations in National Government Accounting and Budgeting in New Zealand'. *Research in Government and Nonprofit Accounting*, 9:323-348.
- Perez, C.C. and Hernandez, A.M.L., (2005). 'The Impact of the Political system on Governmental Accounting Innovation: A comparative Study of Argentina and Chile from the Dictatorial Period to the Nineties'. In: Bourmistrov, A. and Mellemvik, F. (eds). *International Trends and Experiences in Government Accounting of the 9th CIGAR Conference*. Norway: Bodo Graduate School of Business.
- Pinaa, V., Torresa, L. and Yetanoa, A., (2009). 'Accrual Accounting in the EU Local Governments: One Method, Several Approaches'. *European Accounting Review*, 18 (4):765-807
- Rahaman, A.S., Everett, J. and Neu, D., (2007). 'Accounting and the move to privatize water services in Africa'. *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, 20 (5):637-670.
- Ramirez, C., (2001). 'Understandingsocial closure in its cultural context: accounting practitioners in France (1920-1939)'. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 26:391-418.
- Ronnäs, Per and Sjöberg, Örjan (1991), *Economic reform in Vietnam: Dismantling the centrally planned Economy*, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp. 7 - 19.
- Saleh, Z., (2005). 'Development in Governmental Accounting and Reporting in Malaysia: An Analysis Using Luder's Contingency Model'. In: Bourmistrov, A. and Mellemvik, F. (eds). *International Trends and Experiences in Government Accounting of the 9th CIGAR Conference*. Norway: Bodo Graduate School of Business.
- Shenkin, M. and Coulson, A.B., (2007). 'Accountability through activism: learning from Bourdieu' *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, 20 (2):297-317.

- Steccolini, Ileana (2004), Is the annual report an accountability medium? An empirical investigation into Italian local governments, *Financial Accountability and Management*, 20(3), August.
- Swartz, D., (1997). *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- The IMF (2000), Transition economies: and IMP perspective on progress and prospects, Issues brief, November 3.
- The IMF (1999). 'Progress Report: Developing International Standards'.
- Webb, J., Schirato, T. and Danaher, G., (2002). *Understanding Bourdieu*. Crows Nest, NSW Australia: Allen & Unwin.
- Wynne, A., (2008). 'Accrual accounting for the public sector-a fad that has had its day?' *International Journal on Government Financial Management*, VIII (2).
- Xu, Y. and Xu, X. (2008), Social actors, cultural capital, and the state: the standardization of bank accounting classification and terminology in early twentieth-century China, *Accounting, Organizations and Societ*, Vol. 33(1), pp. 73-102.

Document Sources:

- Antara News, *ICW: Upaya Pelemahan Kpk Masih Terus Terjadi* [ICW: Effort to weaken KPK is still ongoing], 6 April 2011
- Antara News, Indonesian auditors reject govt's 2005 budget accounts, 4 October 2006
- Antara News, *Reformasi Birokrasi Di Pusat Ditargetkan Selesai 2014* [Bureaucary Reform targeted finish 2014], 6 April 2011
- Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik Indonesia (2009), *Ikhtisar Hasil Pemeriksaan Semester I Tahun 2009*, Jakarta, Indonesia
- Blondal, J., (2009). 'Budgeting in Indonesia'. *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, 2.
- Emmerson, Donald K. (1999) "Exit and Aftermath: The Crisis of 1997-98 " In *Indonesia Beyond Suharto, Polity Economy Society Transition*, ed. Donald K. Emmerson. New York: Asia Society.
- Habir, Ahmad D., (1999). 'Conglomerates: All in the family?' In: Emmerson, D.K. (ed). *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*. New York: Asia Society.
- Hadiz, V.R., (2001). 'Capitalism, Oligarchic Power and the State in Indonesia'. *Historical Materialism*, 8:119-151.
- Hadiz, Vedi R. (2004) "The State of Corruption: Indonesia " In *Challenging Corruption in Asia: Case Studies and a Framework for Action*, eds. Vinay Bhargava and Emil Bolongaita. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- <http://www.adb.org/Documents/TACRs/INO/37025-INO-TACR.pdf>
- Indonesia Corruption Watch (2009), *Laporan Tahunan Indonesia Corruption Watch 2009: Bersama Rakyat Memberantas Korupsi*
- Indonesia Corruption Watch (2010), *ICW Annual Report 2010*
- Indonesia, T.R.o., (1968). 'Undang-undang [Law] No. 9 tahun 1968: Perubahan Artikel Pasal 7 lindiische Comptabiilliteitwet (Sstbl.. 11992255 Nomor 444488) [The

- Amandment of Article 7 lindiische Comptabiilliiteitsswet (Sstbl.. 11992255 Nomor 444488)]. Jakarta.
- Indonesia, The Republic of. "The 1945 Constitution (Amendments)."
- Indonesia, The Republic of. 1993. "Nota perhitungan anggaran negara Th. anggaran 1992/93 [Report on national annual revenues of Indonesia]." Jakarta.
- Indonesia, The Republic of. 1997. "Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of October 31, Letter of Intent of the government of Indonesia to the International Monetary Fund."
- Indonesia, The Republic of. 2001. "White Paper on Reform of Public Financial Management System in Indonesia: Principle and Strategy, November 30." ed. The Ministry of Finance Financial Management Reform Committee. Jakarta.
- Indonesia, The Republic of. 2002. "Keputusan Kepala Badan Akuntansi Keuangan Negara No. 9 (Kep-09/Ak/2002): Pedoman Akuntansi Barang Milik/Kekayaan Negara pada Departemen/Lembaga [Accounting guideline for government assets at departments/institutions]." ed. Departemen Keuangan [Ministry of Finance]. Jakarta.
- Indonesia, The Republic of. 2002. "Keputusan Kepala Badan Akuntansi Keuangan Negara No. 10 (kep-10/Ak/2002): Pedoman Penyusunan Neraca Departemen/Lembaga [Guideline for preparing departments/agencies' balance sheet statements] ", ed. Departemen Keuangan [Ministry of Finance].
- Indonesia, The Republic of. 2002. "Keputusan Kepala Badan Akuntansi Keuangan Negara No. 11 (kep-11/Ak/2002): Pelaksanaan Penyusunan Laporan Realisasi Anggaran dan Neraca Departemen/Lembaga Tahun Anggaran 2002 [Guideline for Budget Realisation Report and Balance Sheet Statement for Departments/Institutions in the year 2002]." ed. Departemen Keuangan [Ministry of Finance]. Jakarta.
- Indonesia, The Republic of. 2003. "Keputusan Kepala Badan Akuntansi Keuangan Negara No. 11 (Kep-11/Ak/2003): Pedoman Teknis Akuntansi Barang Milik Negara pada Kementerian Negara/Lembaga [technical guideline for government asset accounting at ministries/agencies]." ed. Departemen Keuangan [Ministry of Finance].
- Indonesia, The Republic of. 2003. "Keputusan Menteri Keuangan [The Ministry of Finance Regulation] No. 337/Kmk.012/2003:Sistem Akuntansi Dan Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah Pusat [Accounting System and Central Government Financial Report]." ed. Departemen Keuangan. Jakarta.
- Indonesia, The Republic of. 2004. "Keputusan Kepala Badan Akuntansi Keuangan Negara no. 16 (Kep-16/Ak/2004): Pelaksanaan Penyusunan Laporan Keuangan Kementerian Negara/ Lembaga Tahun Anggaran 2004 [Preparation for Ministries/Agencies Financial Report for the year 2004]." ed. Departemen Keuangan [Ministry of Finance].
- Indonesia, The Republic of. 2004. "Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah Pusat Tahun 2004 [Government Financial Report for the year 2004]." ed. Departemen Keuangan. Jakarta.

- Johnson, C., (1998). 'Survey of Recent Developments'. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 34 (2):3-59.
- Kompas Newspaper. 'DPR Semakin Jauh dari Rakyat [DPR is getting far from people]'. 10 March. 2008
- Liddle, R.W., (1999). 'Regime: The New Order '. In: Emmerson, D.K. (ed). *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*. New York: Asia Society.
- Lindblad, T.J., (1997). 'Survey of Recent Developments'. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 33 (3):3-33.
- Malley, Michael, (1999). 'Region: centralization and resistance'. In: Emmerson, D.K. (ed). *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*. New York: Asia Society.
- Marwata and Manzurul Alam. 2006. "The Interaction Amongst Reform Drivers in Governmental Accounting Changes." *Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change* 2(2):144-163.
- Nasution, A. (2008). Combating Corruption in Indonesia since 1997. *Slide prepared in Second Meeting of the INTOSAI's working Group: Fight against International Money Laundering and Corruption-FAIMLAC*, Cairo, Egypt, 29-31 July.
- Nasution, A., (2007). 'Peranan BPK dalam Mewujudkan Cita-Cita Reformasi Sistem Sosial Indonesia'. Jakarta: Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan.
- Prasodjo, D.E., (2006). 'Reformasi Kepegawaian (Civil Service Reform) di Indonesia'. *Jurnal Demokrasi & HAM, The Habibie Center*, 5 (3).
- Rayda, Nivell (2010), Prosecutors Seek 3 Years for BI Bribery Case Suspects, , May 05, 2010, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com>
- Robison, R., (1981). 'Culture, politics and economy in the political history of the New Order'. *Indonesia*, 31 (April):1-29.
- Sekretariat DPR RI Indonesia and UNDP, (2009). 'Laporan Lima Tahun DPR RI 2004-2009: Mengemban Amanat dan Aspirasi Rakyat'. Jakarta: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia.
- Simanjuntak, Binsar H. (2010), Penerapan akuntansi Berbasis Akrua Di Sektor Pemerintahan Di Indonesia, Kongres Xi Ikatan Akuntansi Indonesia, Jakarta, 9 Desember.
- The Accountant, INTERVIEW: Moving forward against the odds, 30 September 2006
- The Airlangga University (2010), the accreditation report of Airlangga University's magister accounting program for year 2010
- The Asian Development Bank (2010) Indonesia: State Audit Reform Sector Development Program Completion Report March 2010,
- The Asian Development Bank, 2005, *Technical Assistance to the Republic of Indonesia for the Establishment of an Anticorruption Commission*. Manila., <http://www.adb.org/Documents/TACRs/INO/37025-INO-TACR.pdf>
- The Asian Development Bank's website
- The Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation(<http://www.hivos.nl>)
- The ICW website <http://www.antikorupsi.org/>
- The Jakarta Post, 2008, Al Amin faces multiple charges, Jakarta, Wednesday, 08/27
- The Jakarta Post, Bureaucracy an instrument of secrecy: Activists, 22 June 2010

The Jakarta Post, House, govt in blame game on weakening of the KPK, 11 September 2009

The United Nations, (2005) "Republic of Indonesia: Public Administration Country Profile."

The United States Agency for International Development (2009), Final Report: Executive Summary Local Governance Support Program, December 30.

The World Bank (1998). 'Indonesia Public Expenditure Review: The Budget, Off-Budget Items, State-Owned Enterprises. '.

The World Bank (1996). 'Implementation completion report: Indonesia; accountancy development project.

The World Bank (2001). 'Implementation completion report on a loan in the amount of US\$25.0 million to Indonesia for accountancy development II'.

The World Bank website: <http://web.worldbank.org/>

Transparency International Indonesia (TII) website <http://www.ti.or.id/>

Warta BPK (BPK newsletter), January 2009, Edisi I.